The York Philosophy Colloquium

The York Philosophy Colloquium is run by the Department of Philosophy at the University of York. We meet most Wednesdays during term in the department’s seminar room SB/A009 in Sally Baldwin Building Block A, usually between 16:00 and 17:30. The colloquium is followed by drinks.

Programme 2017 / 2018

  • October 4
    Seth Lazar (Australian National University)
    ‘Deontological Decision Theory and the Grounds of Subjective Permissibility’
    What grounds deontological judgements of subjective permissibility? In virtue of what is an act subjectively permissible or impermissible? I will consider two possibilities: verdicts of objective permissibility; and objective moral reasons. On the first approach, subjective permissibility aims to optimally satisfy objective permissibility, given our uncertainty, and weighing risks and opportunities. On the second approach, subjective permissibility aims to optimally satisfy our objective moral reasons, given our uncertainty. An account of subjective permissibility adopts the verdicts approach if it takes objective verdicts as inputs. One example: 'minimise expected objective wrongness' (Graham [2010]; Olsen [2017]). The reasons approach is naturally associated with: 'maximise expected objective deontic value' (Colyvan et al. [2010]; Oddie and Milne [1991]). I will argue that the reasons approach is right, but that we have to put more of the 'deontological' into 'deontological decision theory', and rely less on the model of orthodox rational decision theory.
  • October 18
    Jonathan Jacobs (CUNY)
    ‘Resentment and Civility: Keeping Criminal Justice Within Limits’
    Despite respects in which resentment can be toxic as a sentiment and as a motive it can have a morally constructive role and there are reasons not to wish it away or always resist it as fully as possible. It can, as Adam Smith argued, reflect a concern to see justice done and it is connected with regarding persons—wrongdoers and victims—as voluntary, accountable agents. Properly ordered resentment can help sustain the civility of civil society. (P.F. Strawson gave a somewhat different account of resentment’s place in moral life.) I am not defending Smith’s moral theory though there are rich moral-psychological resources in it. The other main claim is that an approach to criminal sanction that is fairly austere and focuses on desert, censure, proportionality, and parsimony—rather than consequentialist aims—is a good candidate for being morally and politically justifiable. I outline the case for this and for the way that the considerations concerning resentment figure in making the case.
  • October 25
    Peter Epstein (Cambridge)
    A Priori Concepts in Euclidean Proof’
    For over two millennia, Euclid’s Elements was seen as a paradigm of a priori reasoning. With the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, and the eventual realization that our universe is itself non-Euclidean, the status of our geometrical knowledge was radically undermined. In the wake of this upheaval, philosophers adopted two revisionary interpretations of Euclidean proof. Some suggested that we understand Euclidean proof as a purely formal system of deductive logic – one not concerned with specifically geometrical content at all. Others suggested that Euclidean proof employs concepts derived from our sensory experience or imagination. I argue that both interpretations fail to capture the true nature of our geometrical reasoning. Euclidean proof is not a purely formal system of deductive logic, but one in which our grasp of the content of geometrical concepts plays a central role; moreover, our grasp of this content is a priori, rather than being derived from experience.
  • November 8
    Heather Logue (Leeds)
    ‘Gender Fictionalism’
    The nature of gender is at the heart of ongoing public conversations occasioned by the increased visibility of transgender people—for example, when someone born with a Y-chromosome and a penis holds the sincere belief that she is a woman, what exactly does she believe herself to be? This question raises a dilemma. On the one hand, any theory on which sincerely believing that one is a woman isn't sufficient for being one entails that some women aren't women. On the other, we can avoid excluding any women by refusing to specify any condition on being a woman beyond believing that one is. But in this case, we wouldn't have a satisfying answer to the question of what someone who believes that she is a woman believes herself to be. We can respond to this dilemma by adopting fictionalism about gender. Broadly speaking, fictionalism is the view that some portion of our ordinary talk is best characterised as not aiming at literal truth, but rather as constituting a fiction. Just as we can be fictionalists about mathematical talk, talk of possible worlds, or talk of morality, we could be fictionalists about talk of gender. This enables us to say that there is simply no fact of the matter as to what womanhood (manhood, etc.) really is. On this view, being a woman can be a matter of believing that one is—it’s just that the belief ascribes a property posited within the scope of a fiction, and so there need be no deep, substantive answer to the question of what someone who believes she is a woman believes herself to be. The main task of this talk will be to develop the details of gender fictionalism, and to respond to some obvious objections.
  • November 15
    Charles Pigden (Otago)
    ‘Two Arguments for Emotivism and a Methodological Moral: Russell, Ayer and Moore’
    In 1913 Russell gave up on the Moorean good. But since naturalism was not an option that still left two alternatives: the error-theory and non-cognitivism. On the whole, Russell preferred non-cognitivism. Why? Because emotivism sorts better with Russell’s Fundamental Principle that the ‘sentences we can understand must be composed of words with whose meaning we are acquainted’. I construct an argument for emotivism featuring the Fundamental Principle that closely parallels Ayer’s verificationist argument in Langauge, Truth and Logic. I contend that Russell’s argument, like Ayer’s, is vulnerable to a Moorean critique. This suggests an important moral: revisionist theories of meaning such as verificationism and the Fundamental Principle are prima facie false. Ditto revisionist theories of the meanings of the moral terms such as emotivism.
  • November 22
    Jordi Fernandez (Adelaide)
    ‘The Functionalist Theory of memory’
    The purpose of this paper is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. First, I will discuss the two main existing conceptions of the conditions that a mental state must satisfy to count as an episode of remembering. The first of these approaches is backward-looking. It puts forward conditions that strictly concern the aetiology of the mental state. I will argue that the conditions offered by the backward-looking approach are both too strong and too weak: They rule out mental states which, intuitively, count as memories while including mental states which, intuitively, do not qualify as memories. The second approach is forward-looking. It puts forward conditions that only concern the use that the subject makes of the mental state while forming beliefs about their own life. I will argue that the conditions proposed by the forward-looking approach are both too weak and too strong as well. However, the discussion of the two approaches will allow us to extract some helpful lessons on the constraints that any proposal about the nature of remembering should respect. I will draw on the literature on functionalism to offer an alternative approach. I will argue that this approach can, on the one hand, accommodate as memories those mental states which indicate that the backward-looking approach and the forward-looking approach are too strict while, on the other hand, excluding those mental states which suggest that the two alternative approaches are too permissive. Accordingly, I will conclude that construing memory along functionalist lines is a satisfactory approach to the nature of remembering.

Programme 2016 / 2017

  • October 12
    Arif Ahmed (Cambridge)
    ‘Belief and statistical evidence’
    Hume's argument concerning miracles and the well-known gate-crasher paradox are both cases where people seem reluctant to believe something, or courts seem reluctant to convict someone, despite extremely strong statistical evidence that the thing is true or that the person is guilty. I propose to account for this in terms of some simple ideas from Signal Detection Theory. The upshot is that Hume is still right, but the courts may sometimes be wrong.
  • October 19
    Anna Mahtani (LSE)
    ‘Arguments for Probabilism’
    I examine both dutch book arguments and accuracy arguments for probabilism. On a natural interpretation of these arguments, they both invoke the idea of truth across possible worlds. I argue that on this natural interpretation of the arguments, they are better described as arguments for something analogous to the metaphysical necessity of probabilism, rather than for the conclusion that probabilism is rationally required. I suggest two different alternative ways of interpreting these arguments under which they seem better suited to argue for the claim that probabilism is a requirement of rationality.
  • October 26
    Justin Snedegar (St. Andrews)
    ‘Reasons and Practical Inquiry’
    I argue that normative reasons are question-relative. According to this view, whether some consideration is a reason for a given option depends on the deliberative question at issue. Given a standard theory of questions, this amounts to the claim that reasons are contrastive, or relativized to alternatives -- reasons for A rather than B, instead of reasons for A simpliciter. I proceed by first arguing for a particular view of deliberation, or practical inquiry. I support this view by showing how it elegantly accommodates Michael Bratman's observation that our plans and intentions are typically partial, and need to be filled in as the time for action approaches. I then argue that given this picture of deliberation and the role of reasons in deliberation, we should accept a question-relative, or contrastive, view of reasons.
  • November 9
    Gerald Lang (Leeds)
    ‘Equality and Variation’
    Liberal egalitarians often task themselves with answering the ‘equality of what?’ question: assuming we are equals, what should we distribute equally? But is that assumption reliable? What is it about us that makes it appropriate to distribute to each of us an equal amount of something-or-other? Theorists such as Ian Carter and Jeremy Waldron think that there is a fundamental category of equality, ‘basic equality’, which we should seek, and which, if found, can answer this question. Though tempting, I think the search for basic equality is wrongheaded, and I outline a number of serious reservations about it. These negative conclusions shed oblique but revealing light on what we should be looking for when investigating the foundations of human moral equality.
  • November 16
    Tom Dougherty (Cambridge)
    ‘Communicating Consent’
    Does consent need to be expressed? According to the attitudinal view, a mental attitude can be sufficient for valid consent. I argue that the view is false on the grounds that consent is a form of authorisation and authorisation requires public expression. But although the attitudinal view is false, it contains an important insight: the consent-giver's attitudes are typically the most important determinants of how bad it is for the other person to act without valid consent.
  • November 23
    Gail Leckie (Leeds)
    ‘Words by Convention’
  • January 25 (starts at 4:30 p.m.)
    Elinor Mason (Edinburgh)
    ‘Taking Responsibility for Negligence’
  • February 1
    Timothy Williamson (Oxford)
    ‘Aims and Norms of Belief’
    Knowledge, truth, and rationality have all been proposed as norms of belief. There has also been debate about the logical structure of such norms. This exploratory talk will aim to clarify some of the issues.
  • February 8
    Jonathan Tallant (Nottingham)
    ‘It’s One Thing to Rule Them All and Another Thing to Bind Them’
  • March 1
    Richard Bradley (LSE)
    ‘What is Risk Aversion?’
  • March 8
    John Wigglesworth (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
    ‘Indispensability Arguments and Mathematical Structuralism’
    Enhanced indispensability arguments for mathematical realism aim to show that mathematical entities exist because they are indispensable for explanations of physical phenomena. While these arguments are generally taken to support realism about mathematical objects (platonism), I argue that they support realism about mathematical structures (structuralism). Any realist position, whether about mathematical objects or mathematical structures, must address Benacerraf's (1973) problem concerning our epistemic access to abstract mathematical entities. I argue that the structuralist is in a better position to address Benacerraf’s problem by appealing to a version of mathematical structuralism based on abstraction principles.
  • March 15
    Jenefer Robinson (Cincinnati)
    ‘Emotion and Affective Empathy as Tools for Literary Appreciaition’
  • April 19
    David Brink (UC San Diego)
    ‘Special Concern and Personal Identity’
  • May 3 (Workshop, starts at 1:30 p.m.)
    Michael Devitt (CUNY)
  • May 10
    Rob Trueman (York)
    ‘Substitution in a Sense’
    Can we refer to properties with singular terms? Here is one argument that we can’t: properties are referred to by predicates, like ‘___ is a horse’, and singular terms cannot co-refer with predicates, because singular terms and predicates are not grammatically intersubstitutable. This argument relies on the Reference Principle: If two expressions co-refer, then they are everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. Unfortunately, there are a number of counter-examples to this principle: ‘I’ and ‘me’, for example, co-refer (in any given context), and yet are not grammatically intersubstitutable. In this talk I will patch up the Reference Principle, and thus hopefully save the above argument: we cannot refer to properties with singular terms.
  • May 17
    Alex Grzankowski (Birkbeck)
  • May 31
    Richard Pettigrew (Bristol)
    ‘Choosing for changing selves’
    What you value and the extent to which you value it changes over the course of your life. We make our decisions on the basis of what we believe about the world and what we value in the world. So: to which values should I appeal when making such a decision? My current values? My future values? My past values? Some amalgamation of them all --- past, present, and future --- perhaps with some of them given more weight than others? If this, then how are the weightings assigned? In this talk, I will explore a particular answer to these questions
  • June 7
    Arnon Keren (Haiffa)
  • June 14
    Barry Dainton (Liverpool)