



# The Stage View

Johan E. Gustafsson

# Endurance



# The Problem of Temporary Intrinsic and Endurance




Suppose that  $P_2$  at  $t_2$  has the intrinsic property of having arms wide open and that  $P_1$  at  $t_1$  does not.

## *The Indiscernibility of Identicals*


If  $x$  is identical with  $y$ , then any property of  $x$  is a property of  $y$ .

Since they do not have the same properties  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  cannot be identical.

# Perdurance



# The Problem of Temporary Intrinsic and Perdurant



$S_2$  at  $t_2$  has the intrinsic property of having arms wide open and  $S_1$  at  $t_1$  does not.

This does not conflict with the indiscernibility of identicals, since  $S_1 \neq S_2$ .

But person  $P$  does not at  $t_2$  have the property of having his arms wide open; it is just person stage  $S_2$  that has that property.

One might think that an object that changes shape must itself have a shape simpliciter.

Mark Hinchliff (1996, p. 120):

*If the candle never has the shapes itself, it cannot change its shape.*

# Sider's Stage Theory

Ted Sider (1996) proposes the stage theory as a solution to these problems.

The basic idea is that persons are momentary stages. The stages will be united over time by being *I*-related just like on David Lewis's view.

But the four-dimensional worm of aggregated *I*-related stages is not a person on Sider's view.

On the stage view, I am not identical with the one who gave the lecture last week. Yet I *was* identical with the one who gave the lecture last week.


To make sense of this, we need to take a look at Lewis's theory modal counterparts, which is what inspired Sider's view.


## Lewis's Modal Realism

In world 1, the actual world,  $P_1$  does not at  $t_1$  have his arms wide open; but he could have.

Lewis (1986) analyses such modal claims (claims about possibility and necessity) in terms of concrete possible worlds:

If  $P_1$  could have had his arms wide open at  $t_1$ , then there is a possible world where a counterpart to  $P_1$  does so.





Since  $P_1$  in World 1 at  $t_1$  does not have the intrinsic property of having arms wide open but  $P_2$  in World 2 at  $t_1$  has this property, the indiscernibility of identicals rules out that  $P_1$  is identical with  $P_2$ .

*The Indiscernibility of Identicals*

If  $x$  is identical with  $y$ , then any property of  $x$  is a property of  $y$ .

One might try to retain that  $P_1 = P_2$  by translating this property into an extrinsic property.


Both  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  could have the property of having-arms-wide-open-in-World-2-at- $t_1$ .

But Lewis thinks that there are at least some intrinsic properties that one things possess but could have failed to possess.


Sider (1996, p. 437):

*There is a close analogy here with Lewis's counterpart theory of de re modality. According to counterpart theory, an object,  $x$ , has the property possibly being  $F$  iff there is some object in some possible world that has  $F$ , and bears the counterpart relation to  $x$ . The  $I$ -relation plays the role for the stage view that the counterpart relation plays in counterpart theory. The temporal operator 'was', and also other temporal operators like 'will be', 'will be at  $t$ ', etc., are analogous to the modal operator 'possibly'.*

# The Stage View




# The Problem of Temporary Intrinsic and The Stage View



$P_2$  at  $t_2$  has the intrinsic property of having arms wide open and  $P_1$  at  $t_1$  does not.

Yet we do not have a conflict with the indiscernibility of identicals, because  $P_1$  is not identical with  $P_2$ .

We merely have that  $P_1$  at  $t_1$  *will be identical* with  $P_2$  at  $t_2$ .



Unlike on Lewis's view, person's have shapes simpliciter on Sider's stage view.

So he do not need reject the plausible principle about change that:  
An object that changes shape must itself have a shape simpliciter.


# Sortal Predicates

Katherine Hawley (2001, p. 43):

*Stage theory has it that sortal predicates like 'is a tennis ball' are satisfied by the same brief object as instantiate properties like being spherical.*

The same holds for the sortal predicate 'is a person' and the property *having arms wide open*. The same thing that is a person also has the property of having arms wide open.

This is not the case on the perdurance view where the things that have the property of *having arms wide open* are person stages rather than persons.



If Sider is facing a division like Parfit's My Division, he claims both:

- (1) I at  $t_1$  will be Lefty at  $t_2$ .
  - (2) I at  $t_1$  will be Righty at  $t_2$ .
- But he does not claim that
- (3) I at  $t_1$  will be both Lefty and Righty at  $t_2$ .

While this might seem strange, it is analogous to how possibilities work.

We can accept

- (1) I could go to work tomorrow.
- (2) I could stay at home tomorrow.

even though we do not accept

- (3) I could go to work tomorrow and stay at home tomorrow.

Like Lewis, Sider claims that  $I = R$ , but in Sider's theory  $I$  (the unity relation for people) is the relation of being temporal counterparts and it holds between people.

On Sider's solution, however, there is no multiple occupancy. And he comes closer to the common-sense platitude that identity is what matters in survival, since he can claim that

For any person  $P_1$  and any person  $P_2$  existing at some time in the future,  $P_2$  matters for  $P_1$  if and only if  $P_1$  *will be identical with*  $P_2$  at the future time.

# Persistence

If persistence means that one exists at more than one time, then we do not persist on the stage view.

This seems counter-intuitive.

We do persist, however, in the sense that we both exist now and previously existed in the past.

# Atemporal Counting

How many people have been sitting in your seat during the last hour?

Intuitively, the answer is one or perhaps two. But on the stage view there is a stage for each moment during the last hour in your seat and none of these stages are identical with each other.

Since these stages are people, the answer is a lot higher than two, perhaps even infinite.

## References

- Hawley, Katherine (2001) *How Things Persist*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hinchliff, Mark (1996) 'The Puzzle of Change', *Philosophical Perspectives* 10:119–136.
- Lewis, David (1986) *On the Plurality of Worlds*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sider, Theodore (1996) 'All the World's a Stage', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74 (3): 433–453.